University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

2-1-2017

Liberty at the Cost of Constitutional Protections:
Undocumented Immigrants and Fourth
Amendment Rights
Linet Suárez

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Linet Suárez, Liberty at the Cost of Constitutional Protections: Undocumented Immigrants and Fourth Amendment Rights, 48 U. Miami
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 153 (2017)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol48/iss2/7

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Miami Inter-American Law Review by an authorized editor of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

Liberty at the Cost of Constitutional
Protections: Undocumented Immigrants
and Fourth Amendment Rights
Linet Suárez*
The Supreme Court has issued many opinions indirectly addressing the Fourth amendment rights of undocumented immigrants. However, none of these opinions answer the questions that matter most: do undocumented immigrants have
Fourth Amendment protections and if so, what are they.
These questions have increasingly become more important
because advances in technology facilitate intrusive searches
and seizures by law enforcement officers. This article will
specifically focus on the Department of Homeland Security
and its use of GPS ankle bracelets to monitor undocumented
immigrants. This article compares existing Supreme Court
opinions concerning undocumented immigrants and Fourth
Amendment rights in the technological age. It is now more
important than ever to find some legal clarity if we ever plan
to answer how far is too far
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The Statue of Liberty is engraved with the words “give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” but
it diplomatically omits any mention of subjecting these masses to
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intrusive government searches.1 It would be more accurate for Lady
Liberty to add that freedom might come at the expense of privacy.
Currently, over nine million undocumented immigrants are living in the United States and between a half-million and one million
more arrive each year.2 Congress frequently creates laws in hopes
of regulating immigration, but those laws adversely affect undocumented immigrants and would otherwise be unacceptable if applied
to citizens or residents with a legal status.3 However, in the words
of Supreme Court Justice Stevens, “even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [some]
constitutional protection.”4
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures—that is assuming the Fourth Amendment applies.5
United States citizens and residents with a legal status are entitled to
receive constitutional protections, such as that of the Fourth Amendment.6 Undocumented immigrants are not afforded such a clear-cut
answer.7 Instead, when the Supreme Court is tasked with addressing
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to undocumented immigrants it replies with the proverbial “it depends.” Undocumented immigrants in the United States are thus living in Fourth Amendment
limbo.
The uncertainty concerning the Fourth Amendment and undocumented immigrants results in a chilling effect.8 Constitutional freedoms are delicate and require “breathing space” to survive.9 Constitutional freedoms suffer when the government excessively regulates
1

The New Colossus-full text, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.
nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/colossus.htm.
2
Kevin J. Fandl, Immigration Posses: U.S. Immigration Law and Local Enf
orcement Practices, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 16. (2008).
3
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
4
Id. at 77.
5
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6
Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the Ins: An Update on Locating the Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based
Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499,
501 (1991).
7
Id.
8
See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 808 (1969).
9
Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963).
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because the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”10 Whatever constitutional freedoms undocumented immigrants do have are “chilled”
because of the uncertainty regarding their rights and a fear of government sanctions.11 Undocumented immigrants would rather suffer
unreasonable searches than risk aggravating government officials by
appealing to Fourth Amendment rights that they may or may not
have.12 The uncertainty surrounding the Fourth Amendment thus
turns constitutional freedoms that the Founding Fathers intended to
be a shield for protection into a sword that the government can wield
against a vulnerable population.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is currently
testing the limits of Fourth Amendment protections with its Alternative to Detention Programs.13 DHS does not have sufficient detention centers to house all the undocumented immigrants coming
into the United States.14 Additionally, the detention centers are expensive and cost an average of $130 per day per person or up to $330
depending on the detention center.15 As a result, DHS is experimenting with low-cost programs to monitor undocumented immigrants.16
The most recent experimental monitoring program from DHS is the
RGV 250 program.17 Under this type of program, DHS releases undocumented immigrant families from custody, but requires that the
heads of households wear a GPS ankle bracelet for an undetermined
amount of time.18 The ankle bracelet alternative only costs an average of $5 a day.19
10

Id.
See US: Immigrants ‘Afraid to Call 911’States Should Reject Corrosive
‘Secure Communities’ Program, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 14, 2014), https:/
/www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/us-immigrants-afraid-call-911.
12
Id.
13
Alicia A. Caldwell, DHS Is Using GPS-Enabled Ankle Bracelets To Track
Immigrant Families Crossing The Border, MCGILL (Dec. 24, 2014), http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/DHS-Is-Using-GPS-Enabled-Ankle?lang=fr.
14
Id.
15
Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Immigrants Object to Growing Use of Ankle Monit
ors After Detention, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/immigration/la-na-immigrant-ankle-monitors-20150802-story.html.
16
Caldwell, supra note 13.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Hennessy-Fiske , supra note 15.
11
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Undocumented immigrants commonly refer to these ankle
bracelets as grilletes, or shackles.20 One of the reasons the ankle
bracelets are reminiscent of shackles is because the devices have
short cords and have to be charged frequently for an estimated two
hours at a time.21 This makes finding job, let alone keeping a job, a
difficult, if not impossible, task.22 Undocumented immigrants also
complain that the ankle bracelets are hot and irritate their skin.23
Most notably, the ankle bracelets are a conspicuous stigma that
brands undocumented immigrants as criminals.24 This affects the
ability of undocumented immigrants to find employment as well as
housing.25 Despite the potential issues of legal consent and the debilitating criminal stigma attached to wearing ankle monitors, DHS
monitored a total of 23,000 undocumented immigrants with ankle
bracelets in 2015, and plans to increase that number to 53,000 in
2016.26
The Supreme Court addressed the dangers that advanced technologies, such as ankle bracelets, pose to an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights in multiple cases. The Supreme Court has even
held the Government’s use of GPS devices to conduct searches is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment in more than one instance. In
United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that GPS tracking
on a car constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.27 More recently, the Supreme Court took another step
towards establishing a precedent against the Government’s use of
GPS technology for searches. In Grady v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a civil program that used GPS ankle bracelets
to monitor recidivist sex offenders was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and constituted a search.28

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hennessy-Fiske , supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Grady v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015).
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The Supreme Court displayed a high regard for privacy and
strong disapproval of unreasonable government searches of a person’s body or effects in Jones and Grady.29 Jones and Grady are
Fourth Amendment landmarks, but it is still unclear how a person’s
legal status in the country would factor into a Fourth Amendment
analysis because it was not at issue in either Jones or Grady.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants in several cases, but it still remains unclear
what constitutional rights undocumented immigrants are entitled to
have or when they can invoke those constitutional rights. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, the majority
of Justices simply assumed that undocumented immigrants had
Fourth Amendment rights.30 The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza
stressed the importance of Fourth Amendment rights for all persons,
but did not distinguish or define the word “persons.”31 The Supreme
Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez limited the scope of
Fourth Amendment rights for undocumented immigrants by debating the meaning of the word “persons” versus the word “people.”32
Nevertheless, despite an extensive constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court Justices in Verdugo-Urquidez were still unable to reach
a definitive decision about the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants.33 The Justices however did provide more clarity on the topic by creating a substantial connections test.34
This article will explore how undocumented immigration status
in the United States can influence a court’s determination on
whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated in DHS programs requiring ankle bracelet monitoring. This article is composed of three
parts. Part I discusses the possible Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants. Part II examines the use of GPS devices
and the constitutionality of the DHS programs such as the RGV 250
program. Part III concludes that the DHS programs using ankle
bracelet monitoring are unconstitutional.
29

Id.; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990).
31
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046.
32
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
33
Id. at 272-73.
34
Id. at 271-73.
30
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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

A. DHS in a Historical Context
The United States has been concerned with the issue of immigration since the late 1700’s.35 During that time, Congress began to
take preemptive measures against the possibility of incoming immigrants because the United States feared a cold war with France.36
Congress proposed multiple bills that were eventually signed into
law by President John Adams.37 These bills resulted in the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798.38 The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 gave
federal agents the power and discretion to remove all dangerous immigrants.39 As a result of this broad power, any political dissent was
effectively criminalized.40
Immigration was radically reformed again in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6166 and created
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).41 Following
the Executive Order, the INS agency was tasked with the immigration and deportation functions that initially were assigned to the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.42
The INS was the primary agency that addressed immigration
concerns until President George W. Bush revaluated immigration
policies after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.43 President Bush signed the
Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, that dismantled INS
and created DHS.44 Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS is given
broad jurisdiction so that it may “(A) prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States
35

Joseph Summerill, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Introduces
“Friendly” Federal Detention Standards and New, Softer Detention Facilities,
59-SEP FED. LAW. 46, 46 (2012).
36
Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the
Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 438 (2007).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Summerill, supra note 35, at 46.
42
Id.
43
Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 513, 513 (2003).
44
Id.

160

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

to terrorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.”45
Under the newly established DHS, the former duties of the INS
were transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”).46 ICE’s mission is to target undocumented immigrants,
money, and material that could be linked to terrorism or general
criminal activities.47 ICE promotes and enforces the DHS’s mission
through arrests, detainment, raids, and more recently, the use of ankle bracelets for monitoring.48
The history of immigration in the United States reveals that “for
reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”49 As a result, since the 1700’s, the regulation of immigration,
especially in times of warfare or political turmoil, has pushed constitutional boundaries.50 Despite the discretion of the executive and
legislative branches over immigration, the Supreme Court has
stressed that DHS is still “subject to important constitutional limitations.”51 DHS’s broad mission does not justify its possibly unconstitutional enforcement methods.52 DHS must only act by “constitutionally permissible means.”53
B. The Problem: What Rights do Undocumented Immigrants
Actually Have?
Immigration is within the domain of federal law, but the federal
government and courts have not been successful at providing clear
guidelines.54 When it comes to immigration, there are many gaps in
the law because there is no comprehensive immigration reform at
45

Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 101.
Summerill, supra note 35, at 46.
47
Id.
48
Fandl, supra note 2, at 21; Caldwell, supra note 13.
49
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 8.
50
See Lash & Harrison, supra note 36; Thiessen, supra note 43.
51
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); Kelsey E. Papst, Protecting
the Voiceless: Ensuring Ice’s Compliance with Standards That Protect Immigrati
on Detainees, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 261, 265 (2009).
52
Papst, supra note 51, at 265.
53
Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983)).
54
Fandl, supra note 2, at 20, 22.
46
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the federal level.55 For example, as of November 2007, 46 states
passed legislation related to immigration and over 1,562 bills were
introduced in all 50 states.56 In total, that was an increase of nearly
300% from year 2006.57 These gaps create inconsistencies in the law
and endow DHS and immigration officials with excessive discretion.58
Immigration is at its a core a complex matter that is further complicated by political disagreements regarding the best way to manage incoming immigrants while also maintaining national security.59
Federal courts intervene when immigration officials or agencies
overstep constitutional boundaries, but not even the Supreme Court
has provided much guidance when it comes to immigration.60 The
lack of clarity regarding the constitutional rights of undocumented
immigrants is largely in part because the Constitution does not distinguish between documented or undocumented immigrants when it
comes to constitutional protections.61 The courts are therefore split
and have only been able to agree that undocumented immigrants are
entitled to some degree of Fourth Amendment protection.62
1. The Assumption of Fourth Amendment Rights: Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza
Adan Lopez-Mendoza was working at a transmission repair
shop in San Mateo, California in 1976.63 After receiving a tip, INS
agents visited the transmission shop to investigate.64 However, the
INS agents arrived without a warrant to search the premises or a
warrant to arrest any of the people on the premises.65 The proprietor
of the transmission shop refused to allow the INS agents to interview
55

Id.
Id. at 22.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Fandl, supra note 2, at 23.
60
Marisa Antos-Fallon, The Fourth Amendment and Immigration Enforcement in the Home: Can Ice Target the Utmost Sphere of Privacy?, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 999, 1014-15 (2008).
61
Fandl, supra note 2, at 29.
62
Antos-Fallon, supra note 60, at 1003.
63
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.
64
Id.
65
Id.
56
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the workers, but one of the INS agents managed to speak to LopezMendoza while another INS agent was having a conversation with
the proprietor.66
The INS agent asked Lopez-Mendoza multiple questions and
Lopez-Mendoza ultimately revealed that he was from Mexico and
had no family ties in the United States.67 At this point, the INS agent
placed Lopez-Mendoza under arrest and had him taken to an INS
office.68 At the INS office, Lopez-Mendoza revealed that he was
born in Mexico, was a citizen of Mexico, and entered the United
States illegally without inspection.69
INS began deportation proceedings against Lopez-Mendoza, but
Lopez-Mendoza challenged the legality of his arrest.70 Lopez-Mendoza’s case went through the judicial system until it reached the
Court of Appeals.71 The Court of Appeals vacated the order of deportation and remanded the case in order to determine whether
Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated during the course of his arrest.72 The Court of Appeals mentioned
“Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights,” but did not specify
or analyze which Fourth Amendment rights Lopez-Mendoza was
entitled to have under the Constitution.73
By the time Lopez-Mendoza’s case reached the Supreme Court,
the Justices already assumed Lopez-Mendoza had Fourth Amendment rights even though he was an undocumented immigrant.74 The
Supreme Court instead focused on whether Lopez-Mendoza had the
right to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in civil proceedings.75
Lopez-Mendoza argued to the Supreme Court that the exclusionary rule was necessary to safeguard his Fourth Amendment rights in

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id.
Id.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1035-36.
Id. at 1036.
Id.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1036.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034.
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the United States.76 At this point, even Lopez-Mendoza was assuming that he had Fourth Amendment rights.77 The Supreme Court Justices did not correct Lopez-Mendoza’s assumption or ask him to
elaborate on which of his Fourth Amendment rights were in danger.78
The Supreme Court instead ultimately held that the exclusionary
rule was not applicable in civil deportation proceedings.79 Justice
O’Connor wrote on behalf of the majority and explained, “important
as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all [emphasis
added] persons, there is no convincing indication that application of
the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute
materially to that end.”80 In the opinion, Justice O’Connor did not
distinguish between the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented
immigrants versus the Fourth Amendment rights of a person with a
legal immigration status.
The Lopez-Mendoza case does not explicitly state that undocumented immigrants have any Fourth Amendment rights.81 However,
throughout the entire opinion the Supreme Court implies that undocumented immigrants have at a minimum some Fourth Amendment
rights.82
2. Limiting the Scope of the Fourth Amendment: United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez
Undocumented immigrants have relied on the holding of LopezMendoza to invoke Fourth Amendment rights, but Lopez-Mendoza
does not stand for the proposition that undocumented immigrants
have Fourth Amendment rights.83 If anything, Lopez-Mendoza limits the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants because it bars the use of the exclusionary rule during civil deportation

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1045-46.
See generally id.
Id.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046.
See generally id. at 1032.
Id.
Id.
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proceedings.84 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez clarifies the holding in Lopez-Mendoza and details the Fourth Amendment landscape
for undocumented immigrants.85
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a Mexican citizen that resided in Mexico.86 The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) suspected that Verdugo-Urquidez was associated with a drug organization that smuggled narcotics into the United States.87 Verdugo-Urquidez was also a suspect in the murder and torture of a United
States DEA agent.88 The United States Government obtained a warrant for his arrest in 1985 and apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in
Mexico in January 1986 with assistance from Mexican law enforcement officers.89 After the arrest, the United States Government
brought Verdugo-Urquidez to a United States Border Patrol station
in Calexico, California, where he was arrested by United States marshals and later moved to a correctional center in San Diego, California.90
After Verdugo-Urquidez was arrested and detained in the United
States, a DEA agent arranged for searches of Verdugo-Urquidez’s
Mexican residences in Mexicali and San Felipe.91 The DEA agent
sought authorization from the Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, but did not ask for consent from Verdugo-Urquidez or get a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate.92
The Mexican law enforcement officials agreed to help the DEA with
the searches and through a combined effort discovered incriminating evidence, such as a tally sheet reflecting quantities of smuggled
marijuana, in the Mexicali residence.93
Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress all the evidence from the
searches in his Mexican residences because it was a violation of his

84

Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843 (1998).
85
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
86
Id. at 262.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 262-63
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Fourth Amendment rights since the DEA did not have a warrant.94
The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.95 By
the time Verdugo-Urquidez’s case reached the Supreme Court the
question presented was, “whether the Fourth Amendment applies to
the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”96
The Supreme Court began resolving the lower court constitutional disputes by distinguishing the Fourth Amendment from the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.97 The Supreme Court wanted to clarify that just because Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to due process
under the Fifth Amendment and a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment that does not mean that he was entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches.98 The Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are trial rights of criminal defendants, but the Fourth
Amendment may be applicable regardless of whether a trial takes
place or evidence is introduced at the trial.99 Furthermore, unlike the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Fourth Amendment violations are
“fully accomplished” at the time of the unreasonable government
intrusion.100 In the case of Verdugo-Urquidez, this means that the
possible Fourth Amendment violation took place outside of the
United States in Mexico.101
The Supreme Court began its analysis by relying on historical
data to explain that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to protect against searches and seizures outside of the United States.102
Historical research reveals that the Framers did not envision the
United States as having the power to conduct searches and seizures
outside of its borders.103 This would mean that the Fourth Amendment protections would not extend to Verdugo-Urquidez because it

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 263.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id.
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was intended to “protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government” in domestic matters.104
Despite the historical research, Verdugo-Urquidez relied on a
series of cases that held aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights to
argue that Fourth Amendment protections should apply to his
case.105 The Supreme Court distinguished the prior cases from Verdugo-Urquidez’s case by stating that unlike Verdugo-Urquidez,
those aliens received constitutional protections when they came into
the United States because they formed “substantial connections with
this country.”106 For example, the undocumented immigrant in
Lopez-Mendoza “voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations.”107 On the other hand, DEA agents forcibly
brought Verdugo-Urquidez to the United States and a “lawful, but
involuntary presence” was not sufficient to develop any substantial
connections to the country.108
The Supreme Court was ultimately not persuaded by VerdugoUrquidez’s arguments and held that that the Fourth Amendment did
not apply to his particular case.109 Although the Supreme Court provided a better understanding of the Fourth Amendment and created
the substantial connection test, it still did not answer whether the
Fourth Amendment protects undocumented immigrants.110
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LANDSCAPE
A. Introducing Technology to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment states that people have the right to “be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”111 The Fourth Amendment has repeatedly been a topic of discussion in the courts because advancements
in technology provide law enforcement officials with the tools to

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 262, 271.
Id. at 274-75.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 286.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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conduct aggressive and prolonged searches.112 This conduct by law
enforcement officials has inspired multiple judges to make “proliferating judicial references to dystopia and George Orwell’s 1984”
because it feels as if “Big Brother” is always watching.113
Over the years, law enforcement officials have relied on technology, such as beepers, for tracking suspects.114 However, the more
recent technological advancement used by law enforcement officials
is a global positioning system (“GPS”).115 GPS is one of the preferred methods of tracking by law enforcement officers because it
can “achieve outcomes that physical surveillance never could.”116
GPS is unique in three ways.117 First, GPS tracking allows for
nearly continuous surveillance.118 For example, a GPS device can
regularly emit signals to a constellation of twenty-seven satellites,
which theoretically means that a law enforcement official could
have constant surveillance.119 Second, a GPS does not require much
human oversight.120 For example, a single police office could oversee multiple suspects being tracked with GPS at the same time.121
Third, a GPS can access historical data and go back in time to review
locations and dates in a way that physical surveillance by a police
office could not.122 For example, law enforcement officials can access information from pre-existing GPS devices, such as one that
has been installed on a suspect’s smartphone.123
Unlike technologies of the past, a GPS has almost no technological limitations.124 From a law enforcement official’s perspective

112

Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends:
United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
113
Id.
114
Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post-United States
v. Jones Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV.
553, 557 (2015).
115
Arcila, Jr., supra note 112, at 3.
116
Id. at 54.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Miller, supra note 114, at 561.
120
Arcila, Jr., supra note 112, at 54.
121
Miller, supra note 114, at 562.
122
Arcila, Jr., supra note 112, at 54.
123
Id.
124
Miller, supra note 114, at 560.

168

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

this make surveillance simpler, but from a Fourth Amendment perspective it can result in more unreasonable searches.125 GPS surveillance can be intrusive and reveal intimate details to law enforcement
officials that they would otherwise not learn through more traditional surveillance.126 For example, when a GPS sends a signal to
multiple satellites then those satellites can accurately triangulate the
location of the GPS within a few feet, or in some cases, within ten
inches.127 Until the courts reach a clear and consistent holding concerning the legality of GPS technology in searches, Fourth Amendment protections should be enforced carefully so as to guard against
unreasonable searches.128
B. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment: Katz v. United States
Courts traditionally used a common law trespass analysis to determine if the Government conducted an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment.129 This is commonly known as the Fourth
Amendment property model.130 Under this model, courts would base
their analyses on whether the search took place in a “constitutionally
protected area.”131 However, the advancements in technology forced
courts to adapt and consider new methods of analyzing the Fourth
Amendment. One of the first cases to remodel traditional Fourth
Amendment analyses was Katz v. United States.132
The petitioner in Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment in the District Court for the Southern District of California
for transmitting wagering information from Los Angles to Boston
and Miami by telephone.133 Unbeknownst to Katz, he was being recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with an electronic listening and recording device at the time he was making the
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phone calls and transmitting wagering information in a public telephone booth.134 At the trial, the Government was allowed to introduce evidence of Katz’s phone calls over Katz’s objections.135 The
Court of Appeals rejected that the recordings were a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no physical entrance into the
phone booth where Katz was making the call.136 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to answer the petitioner’s two questions: whether
a public telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area such
that any evidence collected by an electronic listening device was a
Fourth Amendment violation and whether physical entrance into a
constitutionally protected area is necessary to have a Fourth Amendment violation.137
The Supreme Court began its analysis by disagreeing with
Katz’s phrasing of the issues.138 According to the Supreme Court,
both Katz and the Government were incorrect to focus their arguments on whether or not the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area.139 That type of argument deterred from the fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”140 The Supreme Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment might constitutionally protect
what a person seeks to keep as private.141 That means that the Fourth
Amendment “cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion.”142 It is at that point that the Supreme Court began to move
away from a Fourth Amendment common law trespass model towards a privacy model.143
Under the privacy model, even though Katz entered a transparent, public phone booth, he still expected to exclude “the uninvited
ear” from his private conversation.144 The Supreme Court explained
that, “one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind
134
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him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world.”145 The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s holding and concluded that whether Katz was in an office, a
home, or a hotel room, he was “entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures,” especially when he
clearly intended his conversations to remain private.146
Katz is notable for it’s move towards a privacy model, but also
for Justice Harlan’s concurrence. Justice Harlan’s concurrence
agrees with the majority that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” but takes a step further in an attempt to answer what
protection it affords people.147 Justice Harlan attempts to answer this
question by creating a reasonable expectation of privacy test.148 The
reasonable expectation of privacy test is twofold: does a person have
a subjective expectation of privacy and would that expectation be
one that society would recognize as reasonable.149 According to Justice Harlan, the reasonable expectation of privacy test provides a
better scope of Fourth Amendment protections.150
C. The Supreme Court Directly Addresses the GPS: United States
v. Jones
The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jones is possibly one of the most important Fourth Amendment decisions since
Katz.151 Jones produced multiple opinions, each with the potential
to alter the Fourth Amendment search and seizure practices.152 Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court in Jones clarified that
although the court had moved towards the privacy model in Katz,
the more traditional common law trespass model had not been replaced.153
145

Id.
Id. at 359.
147
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
148
Id. at 361.
149
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
150
Id.
151
Arcila, Jr., supra note 112, at 5.
152
Id.
153
Vikram Iyengar, United States v. Jones: Inadequate to Promote Privacy
for Citizens and Efficiency for Law Enforcement, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 335, 337
(2014).
146

2016]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

171

Antoine Jones was the owner and operator of a nightclub in D.C.
when he became a suspect for trafficking in narcotics.154 The FBI
and Metropolitan police investigated and applied for a warrant to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to authorize
using a GPS to track the movements of a car registered to Jones’
wife.155 The Court issued a warrant authorizing the use of the GPS,
but only within the District of Columbia and limited to 10 days.156
On the 11th day, the agents installed the GPS device on the car while
it was parked in a public lot in Maryland.157 The Government collected information from the GPS for the next 28 days and even replaced the GPS battery when it ran out.158 The GPS relayed detailed
information to the officers and revealed the car’s location within 50
to 100 feet.159 By the end of the GPS surveillance period, the GPS
relayed “2,000 pages of data over the four–week period.”160
The Government used all the data from the GPS to obtain a multiple-count indictment against Jones and charged him with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.161 Jones was sentenced to life in prison,
but the Court of Appeals reversed Jones’ conviction because the
GPS evidence was collected without a warrant, which was considered a Fourth Amendment violation. After the Government’s petition for a rehearing was denied, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.162
1. Majority Opinion: Justice Scalia
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, returned to the
more traditional common law trespass model to analyze whether
there was a Fourth Amendment violation in Jones’ case.163 Justice
Scalia began by explaining that until Katz Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was based on common-law trespass and that cannot be
overlooked simply because of a rising trend with the privacy
154
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model.164 The Fourth Amendment enumerates privacy in “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” because it has a close connection to
property.165 Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall based solely
on the reasonable expectation of privacy test.166 Otherwise, the
Fourth Amendment would just state “the right of the people to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”167 He further
reasoned that courts should rely on the common law trespass model
before even asking whether a person had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.168 If his statements about the importance of the trespass
theory were still not clear enough, Justice Scalia wrote that “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”169
After shifting towards the trespass model, Justice Scalia stated
that the Government’s actions constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment because the Government physically occupied private
property to obtain information when it attached a GPS to Jones’
car.170 According to Justice Scalia, such a physical intrusion on a
person’s property leaves “no doubt” that a search occurred within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment.171 The Supreme Court concluded its analysis determining that a search occurred, but did not
analyze whether that search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because that specific issue was not raised in the lower
courts.172
2. Concurrence: Justice Sotomayor
Justice Scalia’s views of the common law trespass model versus
the privacy model are binding majority rules because of Justice Sotomayor’s fifth vote.173 Justice Sotomayor added to Justice Scalia’s
majority holding warning about the dangers of technology in her
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concurrence.174 Justice Sotomayor was concerned that technology
has become so advanced that soon it will be possible for the Government to monitor people without physical intrusion on any
space.175
Justice Sotomayor specifically referenced the dangers of GPS
tracking because of its unique attributes.176 She noted that a GPS
reveals aggregated information, has data storage and mining capacities, and is a readily accessible, affordable tool.177 A GPS can accurately produce “a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”178 This is
unrestrained power to collect information that could be easily
abused by law enforcement officials.179
The public’s awareness that law enforcement officials could be
monitoring citizens with GPS is also dangerous because it “chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”180 The knowledge that GPS
monitoring could be taking place at any moment could “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”181 Justice Sotomayor concluded her concurrence by requesting that future law enforcement officials and
judges consider the attributes of a GPS when determining what is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a modern day society.182
D. Modern Day Monitoring: Grady v. North Carolina
Torrey Dale Grady was a recidivist sex offender who lived in
North Carolina.183 Grady was convicted of second-degree sexual offense in 1997 and was convicted again in 2006 for taking indecent
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liberties with a child.184 After serving his sentence, Grady was ordered to appear in court to determine whether he should be subjected
to satellite-based monitoring because he was a recidivist sex offender under a North Carolina statute.185
The satellite-based monitoring program was outlined in the
North Carolina General Statutes.186 The North Carolina statute delineating the logistics of the satellite-based monitoring program
states,
“(c) The satellite-based monitoring program shall
use a system that provides all of the following:
(1)
Time-correlated and continuous tracking of
the geographic location of the subject using a global
positioning system based on satellite and other location tracking technology.
(2)
Reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive schedule or location requirements. Frequency of reporting may range from once
a day (passive) to near real-time (active).”187
In this case, the satellite-based monitoring would effectively require Grady to wear a tracking device at all times.188 Grady argued
that being forced to wear a tracking device would constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and that would violate his constitutional rights.
The trial court was not convinced by Grady’s argument and ordered him to enroll in the satellite-based monitoring program “for
the rest of his life.”189 Grady relied on Jones to appeal his case and
proffered a Fourth Amendment challenge.190 The Court of Appeals
rejected Grady’s challenge a second time, and Grady then petitioned
for discretionary review with the North Carolina Supreme Court, but
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his appeal was dismissed.191 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately issued a per curiam opinion to address Grady’s case.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by citing prior cases that
discussed Fourth Amendment violations that also occurred because
the Government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”192 The Supreme Court stated that if
there is a physical intrusion in a constitutionally protected area, then
it is not necessary to analyze whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.193 The Supreme Court also emphasized that a
search under the Fourth Amendment is possible even though a monitoring program is civil in nature because “it is well settled that the
Fourth Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investigations.”194
In Grady’s case, the satellite-based monitoring program triggers
the Fourth Amendment because the program is designed to obtain
information by physically intruding on Grady’s person.195 This
physical intrusion results in a Fourth Amendment search.196 The
most important question to determine the constitutionality of the
program is whether the search was reasonable.197 The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the North Carolina courts to determine
the reasonableness of the search.198 The Supreme Court provided the
North Carolina courts with guidance for analyzing the reasonableness of the search by writing that reasonableness is determined by
analyzing the totality of the circumstances.199 In order to apply the
totality of circumstances test, the North Carolina Court would have
to look to the nature and purpose of the search as well as the extent
to which the search intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy.200
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IV. PIECING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PUZZLE
TOGETHER
The courts in Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez did not
state that undocumented immigrants have no Fourth Amendment
rights, but they also did not state that undocumented immigrants
have Fourth Amendment rights.201 There is simply no clear answer
as to whether undocumented immigrants have Fourth Amendment
rights or what those Fourth Amendment rights include.202 However,
Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez provide some guidance as
to how a court should make a Fourth Amendment analysis.203
The first factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether there are any substantial connections to the United States.204
According to the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, an undocumented immigrant should form a substantial connection to the
United States before invoking Fourth Amendment protections.205
Although the Supreme Court did not detail what constitutes a substantial connection, it did state that the connection should be voluntary.206
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall expand on the substantial
connection test in their dissent for Verdugo-Urquidez.207 According
to Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, Verdugo-Urquidez did
form a substantial connection to the United States because he was
subject to its criminal laws and he was being investigated for violation of those laws.208 Verdugo-Urquidez was facing criminal sanctions and possibly prison time; therefore, “the Government has made
him a part of our community for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”209 The Government thus can, and did, supply the necessary

201

See generally Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.1032; see also Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259.
202
Watkins, supra note 6, at 501.
203
See generally Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032; see also Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259.
204
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271-72.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 271.
207
Id. at 283.
208
Id. at 286.
209
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 286.

2016]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

177

substantial connection to justify invoking Fourth Amendment protections.210
The second factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis
is where the potential Fourth Amendment violation took place.211 In
Lopez-Mendoza, the Fourth Amendment violation took place in California, which is within the United States borders.212 The Supreme
Court in Lopez-Mendoza assumed the Fourth Amendment was applicable and did not analyze the location of the possible Fourth
Amendment violation.213 Unlike Lopez-Mendoza, the possible
Fourth Amendment violation in Verdugo-Urquidez took place outside of the United States borders in Mexico.214 The Supreme Court
in Verdugo-Urquidez stated that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to restrain the action of the Government outside of the United
States borders.215 Justice Kennedy even stated in his concurrence
that “if the search had occurred in a residence within the United
States, I have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth
Amendment would apply.”216
A third factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether the undocumented immigrant has committed any crimes
and whether his case is civil or criminal.217 At this point it is important to reflect on the DHS’s mission and focus on targeting undocumented immigrants that could be linked to terrorism or general
criminal activities.218 Criminal activity is a priority for DHS, and
therefore, DHS should theoretically be more lenient with undocumented immigrants involved in civil matters—especially considering its limited resources.219 Courts also consider the criminal activity of an undocumented immigrant when determining how far to extend Fourth Amendment protections.220 The Supreme Court in
210
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Lopez-Mendoza was more sympathetic of Lopez-Mendoza because
he was not invoking the Fourth Amendment in a criminal case nor
was he a suspect for a crime.221 Lopez-Mendoza was an immigration
detainee facing deportation, and therefore, his case was “purely
civil.”222 However, the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez was
hesitant to rule in favor of Verdugo-Urquidez because he was suspected of drug smuggling and participating in the murder of a DEA
agent.223
V. ANALYSIS
It is a challenge trying to apply any of the Fourth Amendment
tests or factors to determine whether DHS’s use of GPS ankle bracelet monitoring is constitutional because the undocumented immigrant population is so diverse. There is no typical undocumented
immigrant and to suggest otherwise would be to base a legal analysis
on stereotypes and misinformation. However, for the purpose of this
article, this note assumes certain shared characteristics based on the
factors DHS claims to consider when determining who will wear the
ankle bracelets versus who will stay in a detention center.
DHS immigration enforcement is somewhat of a priority-based
system due to limited resources.224 In keeping with its mission, DHS
focuses on undocumented immigrants that pose a direct threat to national security followed by undocumented immigrants that entered
the country with criminal convictions such as human trafficking,
drug trafficking, child pornography, and other serious crimes.225 According to Jennifer Elzea, an ICE spokeswoman, the undocumented
immigrants that are allowed to leave detention centers and are forced
to wear ankle bracelets are usually “those who don’t pose a threat to
public safety.”226 DHS has also clarified that undocumented immigrants who are under 18, pregnant, or have significant medical issues are not issued ankle bracelets.227
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Considering the scope of the DHS budget and the limitations on
who can wear the ankle bracelets it is possible to assume a few
shared characteristics amongst the undocumented immigrants wearing ankle bracelets. Undocumented immigrants that are subject to
the Alternative to Detention Programs, specifically monitoring
through ankle bracelets, are most likely (1) young to middle aged
immigrants with (2) no criminal record that (3) came to the United
States voluntarily. In order to examine whether the ankle bracelet
monitoring programs, such as current the RGV 250 program, are
constitutional this note will apply a few of the most commonly used
Fourth Amendment tests.
The extent of constitutional protections afforded to undocumented immigrants is still an unanswered question by the Supreme
Court. However, due to the fact that the undocumented immigrants
wearing ankle bracelets are not criminals and are in the United States
voluntarily, it is possible to assume from Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez that they have at least minimal Fourth Amendment
protections.228
A. Trespass Model
Justice Scalia’s trespass model consists of a two-part test that
determines if a constitutional violation occurred.229 The first part
questions whether the Government engaged in a physical intrusion
of a constitutionally protected area.230 The second part questions
whether the intrusion was for the purpose of obtaining information.231 Throughout the analysis it is helpful to keep in mind that
the Fourth Amendment enumerates privacy “in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects” because it establishes the scope of what
is considered a constitutionally protected area.232
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Undocumented immigrants are required to wear the GPS ankle
bracelets for extended periods of time and are constantly being monitored by DHS.233 This means that GPS ankle bracelets are not only
on the person of the undocumented immigrant, but the GPS ankle
bracelets also enter into their houses and their effects.
Did the Government engage in a physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area? Yes. Did the Government intrude in a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining information?
Yes.
B. Privacy Model: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The privacy model test is effectively Justice Harlan’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test in Katz.234 Under this test, a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs when the Government takes certain intrusive actions and a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.235 The test to determine if there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy is twofold: (1) Does a person have a subjective expectation of privacy? and (2) Would that expectation be one that society
would recognize as reasonable?236
Undocumented immigrants wearing ankle bracelets have a
lower reasonable expectation of privacy than other people living in
the United States with a legal immigration status because they already understand that DHS is monitoring their every move. The ankle bracelets do not evaporate all privacy interests entirely though.
Despite the ankle bracelets, undocumented immigrants can still have
reasonable expectations of privacy.
Perhaps most notably, undocumented immigrants have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are inside their homes. The
GPS on the ankle bracelets can send signals to multiple satellites and
those satellites can accurately triangulate the location of the GPS to
within a few feet or sometimes within ten inches.237 That means that
233
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DHS would not only be able to know when you arrive to your home,
but also where exactly you are in your home. DHS could learn intimate details, such as when you are cooking and showering. Undocumented immigrants most likely have a subjective expectation of
privacy that DHS will not be such an extreme constant presence inside their homes. Society is likely to recognize that expectation as
reasonable because society, as well as the courts, recognizes that arbitrary searches of one’s home are a “chief evil” and that the Fourth
Amendment aims to protect the “sanctity of the home.”238
C. Mosaic Theory Test
The mosaic theory best applies to situations when there is longterm surveillance or advanced technology, such as a GPS, that can
relay a great deal of information over a long period of time. In this
case, DHS uses both long-term surveillance and advanced technology. The mosaic theory states that,
“Privacy interests, such as those protected under the Fourth
Amendment, should be
protected in a manner that guards
against collections of small bits of information that individually
may not be particularly revealing but when aggregated may reveal a
great deal.”239
Under the mosaic theory, a collection of a person’s individual
movements can create a rap sheet where the whole reveals “more
than the individual movements it comprises.”240 For example, if law
enforcement officials learn that a person visited a specific coffee
shop on a Sunday and ordered a small coffee, then they might not
learn much even though the surveillance was detailed. If the surveillance is ongoing and law enforcements officials learn that this person visits the same coffee shop and orders the same small coffee
every Sunday, then they have learned about that person’s habits or
patterns.241
If this test is applied, the DHS ankle bracelet program is likely
to be considered unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The
GPS on the ankle bracelets are accurate and can relay highly detailed
238
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information. Undocumented immigrants are also required to wear
the bracelets throughout the day, every single day, for extended periods of time. Not only do the GPS ankle bracelets give DHS a whole
picture of the private lives of these undocumented immigrants, but
they also give an extremely accurate and intimate picture.
D. Balancing Test
The balancing test is typically applied in the civil context to evaluate the “reasonableness” of law enforcement officials in relation to
the Fourth Amendment.242 The test functions by “balancing the legitimate law enforcement interest with the level of intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest.”243 Before applying the balancing test, undocumented immigrants must have a
Fourth Amendment privacy interest.244 The undocumented immigrants wearing ankle bracelets at a minimum have Fourth Amendment privacy interests in their person and their home.
The law enforcement officials in this case are the DHS agency.
DHS’s interest is in preventing terrorist attacks and reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.245 Initially, it appears
that DHS has a weighty interest, but after some analysis, its interests
are not that substantial. The undocumented immigrants wearing the
ankle bracelets do not have criminal records, which is why they were
even allowed to leave the detention centers and enter the monitoring
program. DHS is probably not concerned that the undocumented immigrants wearing the ankle bracelets are the type of people posing a
terrorist threat to the United States or are making the United States
vulnerable. DHS thus has an interest, but not a significant interest.
The undocumented immigrants wearing the ankle bracelets have
an interest in having privacy in their home and their person. The
privacy interest of undocumented immigrants is further strengthened because the home has always been afforded special protection
by the Fourth Amendment.246 Keeping in mind that the ankle brace-
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lets are on at all times and a GPS can relay extremely accurate information, the privacy interest of undocumented immigrants is
much greater than the interest of DHS.
After balancing the interests of DHS and the interests of undocumented immigrants, the interests of undocumented immigrants tip
the scale. The ankle bracelet monitoring programs would be considered unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.
E. Evaluating the Results
The DHS ankle bracelet monitoring programs are unconstitutional under the trespass model, the privacy model, the mosaic theory, and the balancing test. The interests of DHS in continuously
monitoring undocumented immigrants with ankle bracelets do not
compare to the substantial Fourth Amendment privacy interests of
undocumented immigrants.
First, the undocumented immigrants that are being subjected to
ankle bracelet monitoring have no criminal records and do not pose
a serious threat to the United States. Second, the undocumented immigrants wearing DHS ankle bracelets came into the United States
voluntarily. Third, and perhaps most importantly, these undocumented immigrants have either made a substantial connection to this
country or will soon make a substantial connection since they chose
to comply with United States law by wearing the ankle bracelets.
DHS could have a better argument in favor of its ankle monitoring programs if the monitoring were more limited. For example,
DHS could monitor the undocumented immigrants only if they were
to leave the house or perhaps during certain hours of the day. However, the continuous monitoring reveals far too many intimate details that result in unreasonable Fourth Amendment searches.
There is little clarity in the Constitution regarding undocumented immigrants, but at least one thing has always been clear. The
Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the home.247 DHS is the
second-largest investigative force in the federal government and it
should not be focusing its resources on monitoring undocumented
immigrants in a manner that undermines a widely acknowledged
constitutional truth.248
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VI. CONCLUSION
DHS has been consistently violating the Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants with their intrusive policing practices for years in the name of “immigration enforcement.”249 Until the Supreme Court directly answers the question of what Fourth Amendment rights undocumented immigrants
are entitled to, it remains unclear as to what constitutional rights are
afforded to undocumented immigrants. The lack of clarity concerning the constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants might be
a sign that the United States is not ready to abolish citizen and
noncitizen distinctions.250 However, if the United States is not willing to abolish distinctions based on immigration status, then it
should at least guarantee a system of sufficient protections for personal rights.251
The undocumented immigrants that are being subjected to the
GPS ankle monitoring by DHS have already been classified as nonthreating to national security. In fact, it is because these undocumented immigrants do not pose a threat and have no criminal records that they are being released from the detention centers. For their
good behavior and clean records, undocumented immigrants are rewarded by DHS with a release from detention centers and a sentencing of constant monitoring for an undetermined period of time.
This practice of “swapping prison beds for ankle bracelets” is
effectively trading one detention center for a different type of detention center.252 Undocumented immigrants report that living outside
a detention center with ankle bracelet monitoring does not feel much
different than living in a detention center.253 Fresvinda Ponce, a 41year-old mother from Camayagua, Honduras describes her experience by stating “right now I feel free, but at the same time I think
that I’m still not free, as long as I wear this shackle, I’m not happy.
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I feel like I’m still a prisoner.”254 Ponce is condemned to psychologically and physically living with her unhappiness for a seemingly
endless period of time because she does not even know when she
can remove the ankle bracelet.255 Ponce is not alone. Other undocumented immigrants have reported that they too feel frustrated and
demoralized because of the ankle bracelet monitoring programs.256
For example, Carolina Menjivar, a 28-year-old Honduran states that,
“[the ankle bracelet] makes me ashamed, because they only put
them on criminals, and I’m not a criminal yet.”257 Immigrant advocates have stated that because of these experiences, the ankle monitors are not a “true alternative to detention, but rather a way to expand the scope of detention and further punish immigrants living in
the U.S. illegally.”258
It is unjust to treat undocumented immigrants like criminals
without constitutional rights. Undocumented immigrants enter the
United States as foreigners, but they form more than enough connections to the country such that they are entitled to at least minimal
Fourth Amendment protections. After evaluating the Fourth
Amendment, this article concludes that based on the trespass model,
the privacy model, the mosaic theory, and the balancing test, the
DHS ankle bracelet monitoring programs are unconstitutional.
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